
[The producer shall] endeavor in good faith to bring about the reduction of acreage contemplated in this contract in such a manner as to cause the least possible amount of labor, economic, and social disturbance, and to this end, in so far as possible, he shall effect the acreage reduction as nearly ratably as practicable among tenants on this farm; shall, in so far as possible, maintain on this farm the normal number of tenants and other employees; shall permit all tenants to continue in the occupancy of their houses on this farm, rent free, for the years 1934 and 1935 (unless any such tenant shall so conduct himself as to become a nuisance or a menace to the welfare of the producer); during such years shall afford such tenants or employees, without cost, access for fuel to such woods land belonging to this farm as he may designate; shall permit such tenants the use of an adequate portion of the rented acres to grow food and feed crops for home consumption and for pasturage of domestically used live stock; and for such use of the rented acres shall permit the reasonable use of work animals and equipment in exchange for labor.
The contract should have been drawn so that the benefit payments would have been made directly to landlords and tenants in proportion to their respective interests in the crop.... Under the 1934 and 1935 contract the landlord has everything to gain and the cropper everything to lose.
The acreage-reduction program has operated to reduce the number of families in employment on cotton farms . . . due . . . to failure . . . to reduce acreage ratably, forcing some tenants into "no-crop" class . . . at least 15 per cent ... of all ... families.... Many plantation owners eliminate the share-cropping system . . . forcing . . . croppers to accept day labor instead.... Widespread replacement of white by colored labor . . .
Shortly before the submission of this report the department's own investigator, Dr. Calvin Hoover, professor of economics at Duke University, reported to the Secretary as follows:
The operation of the acreage-reduction program creates a motive for reducing the number of tenants on farms.... Contracts . . . have provisions designed to prevent . . . but the system of enforcement . . . has been inadequate.
Secretary Wallace has similarly written:
I am fully aware that acreage adjustment produces its unemployment problem just as the shutting down of factories in the cities.
The cotton contract states that the landlord shall keep the same number of tenants, but does not compel him to keep the same tenant.... There is nothing in the contract in regard to race . . . the landlord would have the right to replace a white tenant with a Negro . . .
- When new contracts are drawn, the labor clauses must have the binding force of law, without quibble or equivocation, and the full protection of the department must be extended to every man, regardless of race, color, or union affiliation, who has honestly performed his labor.
- The right of agricultural laborers to organize and bargain collectively should be proclaimed and recognition of this right written into all contracts.
- Tenants and share-croppers should be given representation upon all boards and local committees set up to administer the AAA program.
- The labor of children under fourteen years of age in the fields should be forbidden by national statute. Many children now begin to pick cotton at the age of five and to "chop" at ten, at wages as low as 3 cents an hour.
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